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Abstract  
 
Scholars argue that ASEAN is a community of nations and not a community of people. Decision making in ASEAN have been 
concentrated within the higher echelon of leadership, with little public engagement. This article analyses whether public 
attitudes and supports for the formation of ASEAN Community were affected by the perception of elitist formation of the 
regionalism initiative. It employs public opinion surveys to gather feedback from respondents about issues under study. The 
surveys conducted in eleven cities in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Statistical analyses were employed for the study. 
Several findings were discovered; Firstly, it finds the respondents perceived that the formation of ASEAN Community is 
beneficial. Secondly, they strongly support the formation of the regional community. Thirdly, the formation is perceived as elitist 
and state-centric as they did not involve the people. Finally, the study concludes that the perceptions of elitist state-centric 
formation of ASEAN Community do have effects on the perception of benefits and supports. As such, the study implies that 
ASEAN should actively involve the public through public opinion surveys for its policies and issues of its establishment. 
 
Keywords: Perception of regionalism process, ASEAN Community, ASEAN, Regionalism, Perceived benefits of regional 
integration, Supports for regionalism initiatives 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
At the end of 2015, the Southeast Asian region will begin the implementation of ASEAN Community. The regional 
community was firstly announced in the ASEAN Vision 2020, envisioning the ASEAN Community as a “concert of 
Southeast Asian nations, outward looking, lives in peace, stability and prosperity, bonded together in partnership in 
dynamic development and in a community of caring societies” (ASEAN Secretariat, 1997). The concept of ASEAN 
Community was more clearly enunciated in the Bali Concord II, issued at the Ninth ASEAN Summit in Bali (Indonesia) on 
7th December 2003 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2003). The ASEAN Community will comprise of three pillars, namely the ASEAN 
Political Security Community, the ASEAN Economic Community, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community aspired to 
be effective in 2015. The three pillars were designed as closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing for the purpose of 
ensuring durable peace, stability and shared prosperity in the region. 
Regarding the formation of ASEAN Community, many regional observers were sceptical as they consider the idea 
as ‘too good to be true’ when taking into account the current regional situation. For example, Kavi Chongkittavorn – a 
Senior Fellow at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Chulalongkorn University – argued, “Nobody expects 
ASEAN to move in the direction of the EU. But as with the EU, the realization of an AC (sic, ASEAN Community) will 
need more than just words and niceties” (Chongkittavorn, 2006). The same scepticism was shown by Ikrar Nusa Bakti – a 
former chairman of the Department of Political Studies at the Indonesian Institute of Science (LIPI) – who argued that, 
“ASEAN has long been known as an elitist organization, controlled by bureaucrats and politicians. ASEAN should belong 
to the general public, so the organization can be relevant to its members and other states outside the region”.  
It seems that the general public of ASEAN countries has not been involved in the establishment of ASEAN 
Community. History in the European integration shows that the public involvement is crucial. The EU's current status and 
its success in economic, political and social integration have clearly been the outcome of consensus, active involvement 
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of the public and policies based on the Eurobarometer surveys on the grassroots. The idea of a European community 
(EC) took years to materialize since the process did not only involve policy makers but also the public’s positive 
perception, acceptance, and understanding. Even prior to the realization and formalization of the EU, policy makers and 
academicians had conducted extensive studies to determine the public’s understanding and acceptance of the idea of a 
regional community. 
For ASEAN integration, however, it is worrying that, besides the absence of public opinion measures in the region, 
studies conducted based on the opinion of the public are scanty. It can be argued that most of the literature on the 
concept and ideas of an ASEAN Community has relied on academic opinion of several scholars. There have been only 
some studies so far on the public opinion towards ASEAN Community. The lack of the public’s perspectives and 
responses to the concept of ASEAN Community has resulted in a gap in the literature on ASEAN regionalism.  
In addition to that, thorough review on the ASEAN regionalism literature found no specific reference to the effect of 
perceived elitist and state-centric formation on public attitudes towards the formation of ASEAN Community. Studies on 
ASEAN are numerous, yet they were conducted using the elite decision making approach for assessing the 
establishment processes or the social, political, and economic challenges of ASEAN (Acharya 2003; Guerrero 2008; Hew 
2007) as well as the readiness of the business sector for ASEAN Community (Abidin, Loh and Aziz 2012; Mugijayani and 
Kartika 2012). Studies involving public opinion in ASEAN are quite rare – only a few studies so far exist conducted by 
Benny, Rashila and Tham (2014); Abdullah and Benny (2013), Abdullah, Benny and Din (2010), Benny and Abdullah 
(2011), Moorthy and Benny (2012a, 2012b, and 2013); and Thompson and Thianthai (2008). 
The purpose of this article is to discuss, evaluate and analyze public supports, perceived benefits, and opinions 
towards the proposed formation of ASEAN Community. This study argues that public supports are influenced positively 
by the respondents’ perception regarding the benefits of regional integration. The study also argues that public supports 
and perception regarding the ASEAN Community are influenced the opinion regarding the formation process of the 
regional community. Thus, the study is intended to contribute to the body of knowledge of regional integration, especially 
on the role that the public attitudes, opinions and aspirations play in the Southeast Asian regionalism.  
 
2. Studies on Perceived Elitist and State-centric ASEAN and Attitude towards Regional Economic Integration 
 
Previous researches have not systematically examined how perception of state-centric and elitist process in the formation 
of ASEAN Community relates with perception of benefits and supports for the formation. Despite many scholarly 
discussions about perception of state-centric and elitist process ASEAN and attitudes towards economic regional 
integration, the relationship between those variables has not been clearly elucidated. 
Pertaining to ASEAN, some scholarly works in regional studies have remarked that the regional integration process 
appears to be both elitist and state-centric, with little effort thus far to consult the voices of the masses (Acharya, 2003 & 
2009; Sung, 2010; Thi, 2008). The conception of “community” in ASEAN is so elitist as it lacks one of the fundamental 
components of success in the European Community: the involvement of the general public (Abdullah and Benny, 2013; 
Moorthy and Benny, 2012a, 2012b and 2013; Benny and Abdullah, 2011; Benny, Abdullah and Din, 2010; Benny, Rashila 
and Tham, 2014). 
Literatures on regionalism – the transactionalist, neo-functionalist and democratic theories –although at variance in 
their explanation on which attitudes and support are needed for the success of regional integration – have shown that 
opinions and participation of the general public would determine the success of such efforts (Moorthy and Benny, 2012 
and 2013; Benny and Abdullah, 2011; Benny, Rashila and Tham, 2014; Collins, 2008). C.J. Wilson (2004) argues that 
one of the major barriers to regional integration in North America is the lack of public support for closer integration. 
Similarly, M.J. Gabel (1998) asserts that public attitudes are an important component of European integration because 
they provide the political foundation for integration as well as shape and constrain the process of the integration. 
Furthermore, the endurance of the EU political system vitally depends on public compliance with and acceptance of EU 
law which lacks a supranational means of enforcement. Jones argues that public attitudes are important both for the euro 
and the European Central Bank because of the problem of legitimacy in regional financial policy (Jones, 2009). 
Furthermore, the persistent work of Eurobarometer – that have assessed public attitudes, opinions, and aspirations 
towards European regional integration for more than 38 years – shows us that public attitudes, opinions, and aspirations 
are important to be assessed. 
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3. Research Design and Methods 
 
3.1 Measures, Sample and Survey Procedures 
 
The study was based on the surveys conducted in three ASEAN countries, namely Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. 
The purpose of the surveys is to gather information at grassroots level on attitudes, opinions and aspirations for the 
ASEAN Community. In the three countries, the surveys were conducted in eleven major cities countries (Indonesia: 
Greater Jakarta, Makassar, Medan, Surabaya and Pontianak; Malaysia: Greater Kuala Lumpur, Penang, Melaka, Johor 
Bahru, and Kota Kinabalu; and Singapore). The cities were purposively chosen in terms of their importance and influence 
to the economy, polity, and socio-culture of the countries and their connectedness to other countries in the region. To 
measure the responses, several structured close-ended and open-ended questionnaires in were employed.  
Because of the differences in lingua-franca in the three countries, questionnaires were made available in three 
languages (Bahasa Indonesia, Bahasa Malaysia, and English). The questionnaires were checked carefully by the 
professional editors in three languages to ensure that the original ideas of the questions were not diluted. The 
questionnaires were screened in pre-tests, involving 30 respondents for each type of questionnaires, to check the 
structure of the questions and the understanding of target respondents.  
To collect data, surveys and intensive interviews were conducted between June to December 2009, involving 551 
respondents in Indonesia, 451 respondents in Malaysia and 294 respondents in Singapore; so a total of 1,256 
respondents were involved in the study. They were selected by convenience quota sampling, trying to balance the 
proportion of students and staffs respondents. The respondents with a minimum of university student education 
background were required due to the complicated questions structure and the requirement of critical thinking of the 
respondents. The choice of the specific type of the respondents was thought to reflect the reality of them who will be 
active in the establishment of the ASEAN Community. 
Table 1 shows the details of respondents. The Indonesian respondents came from Greater Jakarta (37.1%), 
Medan (15.7%), Surabaya (15.7%), Pontianak (15.7%), and Makassar (15.9%). The Malaysian respondents resided in 
Greater Kuala Lumpur (27.7%), Melaka (20.6%), Penang (19.3%), Johor Bahru (17.5%), and Kota Kinabalu (14.9%). 
Those surveyed consisted of 50.8% male and 49.2% female. The majority of them are younger mature (75.4%), single 
(70.7 %), with undergraduate education background (72.4%) and with lower to middle level of household expenditure. 
Students (46.2%), lecturers (21.9%), and private-sector employees (15.1%) were three major occupations of respondents 
in the three countries (See: Moorthy and Benny, 2013: 406). 
 
Table 1. Profile of Respondents 
 CountriesIndonesia Malaysia Singapore Overall 
Number of the respondents 426 401 213 1,040 
Cities of domicile 
Jakarta 37.1 Kuala Lumpur 27.7
Singapore 100  
Medan 15.7 Melaka 20.6
Surabaya 15.7 Penang 19.3
Pontianak 15.7 Johor Bahru 17.5
Makassar 15.9 Kota Kinabalu 14.9
   
Gender   
 Male (%) 48.0 51.1 55.5 50.8 Female (%) 52.0 48.9 44.5 49.2 
Age (years old)  
 
Younger mature, 18 to 34 (%) 83.8 73.1 63.7 75.4 
Older mature, 35 to 49 (%) 13.4 20.9 22.0 18.1 
Senior, 50 or more (%) 2.8 6.0 14.3 6.5 
Marital status  
 
Single (%) 74.6 70.7 63.6 70.7 
Married (%) 25.2 28.2 35.7 28.6 
Widow/er (%) 0.2 1.1 .7 0.7 
Formal education  
 
Undergraduate (%) 89.2 67.0 50.7 72.4 
Master degree (%) 10.2 22.6 14.4 15.7 
PhD (%) 0.6 10.4 34.9 12.0 
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 CountriesIndonesia Malaysia Singapore Overall 
Occupation  
 
Lecturer (%) 7.1 26.4 40.8 21.9 
Civil servant (%) 8.2 6.4 5.8 7.0 
Private-sector employee (%) 33.5 2.7 2.0 15.1 
Soldier/ Police (%) 0.0 5.1 0.0 1.8 
Doing business (%) 3.1 0.0 0.7 1.4 
Housewife (%) 1.8 0.0 0.3 0.8 
Student (%) 40.9 54.3 42.9 46.2 
Not working (%) 3.1 1.3 0.0 1.8 
Other (%) 2.4 3.8 7.5 4.1 
 
3.2 Measuring Dependent Variables 
 
The dependent variables for the present study are perceived benefits of the ASEAN Community and the supports for its 
formation. Because it is assumed that not all respondents know the concept of ASEAN Community, a brief description of 
the concept of the ASEAN regional integration was conveyed as follow:  
”The leaders of ASEAN Countries signed the Bali Concord II on 7th October 2009. The essence of the concord 
was the acceptance of the ASEAN Community concept that will be effectively implemented in 2015. The concord defines 
the ASEAN Community as a concert of Southeast Asian nations, bonded together in partnership in dynamic development 
and in a community of caring societies, committed to upholding cultural diversity and social harmony. The ASEAN 
Community will comprise three pillars, namely the ASEAN Political Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community, 
and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community that are closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing for the purpose of ensuring 
durable peace, stability and shared prosperity in the region.” 
After the brief description of the ASEAN Community, the questionnaires forwarded the instruction for circling the 
most appropriate number of the level of respondent’ agreement for each statement, followed by five statements for 
measuring their perceived benefits of the ASEAN Community and four statements for the support for the formation of 
ASEAN Communit. The complete description of the questions are presented at the Table 2 while the descriptive statistics 
of this variable are conveyed in Table 3 and 4. 
 
Table 2. Survey questions wording of Dependent and Independent Variables 
Dependent Variable 1: Perceived benefits of the ASEAN Community
1 “My country will get benefits from the membership of the ASEAN Community”(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Not agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree. 
2 “The establishment of ASEAN Community is good for my country and the people”(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Not agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree. 
3 “The formation of the ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC) is good for my country and society”(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Not agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree. 
4 “My country will get benefits from membership in the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC)”Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Not agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree. 
5 The formation of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) is good for the social and cultural development of my country (1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Not agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree. 
Dependent Variable 2: Support for the formation of the ASEAN Community
1 “I support the formation of the ASEAN Community.”(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Not agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree. 
2 “I support the formation of the APSC”(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Not agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree. 
3 “I support the formation of the AEC”(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Not agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree. 
4 “I support the formation of the ASCC”Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Not agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree. 
Independent Variable: Perception on the Formation Process of ASEAN Community
1 “The formation of the ASEAN Community is the initiative of the elite and does not involve the people”(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Not agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree. 
2 “The formation of ASEAN Community is merely a declaration of ASEAN leaders not fruitful to the people” (1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Not agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree. 
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3.3 Measuring Predictors: Perception on the Formation Process of ASEAN Community 
 
The study took from several scholarly works – like Amitav Acharya (2003), Claire Sutherland (2009), Guido Benny, 
Rashila Ramli and Than Siew Yean (2014), Jenina Joy Chavez (2007), Kamarulnizam Abdullah and Guido Benny (2013), 
Kamarulnizam Abdullah, Guido Benny, and Mohamed Anwar Omar Din (2013), Lily Zubaidah Rahim (2008), Melly 
Caballero-Anthony (2009), Ravichandran Moorthy and Guido Benny (2013), Rodolfo Severino (2007), Sung Won Kim 
(2010), and Thi Thu Huong Dang (2008) – that affirmed the ASEAN Community formation process as elitist and state-
centric. Based on those studies, the survey constructed two indicators for measuring the perception of the elitist and 
state-centric formation process of ASEAN Community. The complete description of the questions are presented at the 
Table 2 while the descriptive statistics of this variable are conveyed in Table 5. 
 
4. Method of Analysis 
 
The study has used Pearson Chi-Square test (Pagano, 2013; Gravetter & Wallnau, 2013) to estimate effect of the 
independent variable (perception of elitist and state-centric formation process) on the dependent variables (perceived 
benefits of ASEAN Community and the support for its formation). Since the study aims to test the effect of the 
independent variable on nine indicators of the two dependent variables, there are nine Pearson Chi-Square tests 
conducted (See Table 6).  
 
5. Results and Discussion 
 
5.1 Perceived Benefits of the ASEAN Community 
 
The variable of ‘perceived benefits’ was defined as respondents’ perception of what the proposed ASEAN Community 
and its three pillars may deliver for the benefits of the region, their country and the people. There were some previous 
studies conducted on the perceived benefits of regional integration, but none is within the Southeast Asian regionalism 
context.  
 
Table 3: Perceived benefits of the ASEAN Community 
 
 Respondents Malaysia Indonesia Singapore Average 
My country will get benefits from the membership of the ASEAN 
Community. 
• Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree 
• Mean 4.04Agree 
4.01
Agree 
3.91 
Agree 
4.00 
Agree 
The establishment of ASEAN Community is good for my country 
and the people. 
• Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree 
• Mean 4.07 4.08 3.94 4.05 
Agree Agree Agree Agree 
The formation of the APSC is good for my country and society. 
• Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree 
• Mean 3.94 3.99 3.82 3.94 
Agree Agree Agree Agree 
My country will get benefits from membership in AEC. 
• Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree 
• Mean 3.91 3.82 3.82 3.86 
Agree Agree Agree Agree 
The formation of ASCC is good for the social and cultural 
development of my country. 
• Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree 
• Mean 3.87 3.84 3.78 3.84 
Agree Agree Agree Agree 
 
Source: Result of field surveys conducted by the researchers 
 
In general, the respondents perceived the formation of ASEAN Community as beneficial and positive for the region (see 
Table 3). More than 80% respondents perceived the proposed formation as beneficial to their country and the people and 
optimistic that their country would benefit from membership in the Community. Furthermore, about three-quarters of them 
expressed their belief to the objective of ASEAN Community mentioned in the 2003 Declaration of Bali Concord II – a 
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Community that is able to create a partnership in dynamic development and a community of caring societies with diverse 
cultures and social harmony (ASEAN Secretariat, 2003).  
ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC) is the first pillar of the proposed ASEAN Community. The ASEAN 
Vision 2020 stated that APSC is intended as the institution where the members will live at peace with each other where 
the causes for conflict have been eliminated, through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law and through the 
strengthening of national and regional resilience (ASEAN Secretariat, 1997). Further, Declaration of Bali Concord II 
marked out seven areas where intensified political and security cooperation is to take place: setting values and norms, 
maritime security, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and transnational crime, defense cooperation, the ASEAN 
Regional Forum, and cooperation with the United Nations (Severino, 2006: 356). Regarding the proposed APSC, the 
majority of respondents exhibited their positive perception on its benefits (see Table 3). The survey showed that a great 
majority of those surveyed perceived the formation of ASC as good for their country and society. More specifically, two-
thirds of them showed optimism that ASC would beneficial in making each member fully committed to the peaceful 
resolution of differences and conflicts. Likewise, almost three-quarters of the respondents also indicated that the APSC 
would be useful for regional cooperation in combating transnational security problems, such as terrorism, drugs 
trafficking, trafficking in persons, and cross border crimes. 
Deeper economic integration was envisaged in the Bali Concord II, which described the ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC) as the second pillar (ASEAN Secretariat, 2003). The AEC was described as a single market and 
production base with free flow of goods, services, investments, capital and skilled labour. The Blueprint of the AEC 
outlined four key goals, those are: (1) a single market and production base; (2) a highly competitive economic region; (3) 
a region of equitable economic development; and (4) a region fully integrated into the global economy. Regarding the 
AEC, the majority of respondents showed their positive perception. Nearly three-quarters of those surveyed perceived 
that their countries would benefit from membership in AEC (See Table 3). More specifically, about a great majority of 
them perceived the formation as good or positive to the people and for the business in their country. In addition, 72% 
respondents (74% Malaysians, 75% Indonesians and 62% Singaporeans) believed that AEC would lead to greater 
competitiveness to the region.  
Declaration of Bali Concord II also aspired for the third pillar, the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC), to 
keep the Southeast-Asian bonded together in partnership as a community of caring societies (ASEAN Secretariat, 2003). 
The tenth ASEAN Summit in Vientiane, Laos, pursued the Vientiane Action Programme (VAP) for 2004 – 2010 that 
emphasizes the action programmes for ASCC under four major thrust: (1) building a community of caring societies; (2) 
managing the social impact of economic integration; (3) promoting environmental sustainability; and (4) promoting an 
ASEAN identity. Further, the 2009 ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint emphasizes that the ASCC envisages six 
characteristics: human development, social welfare and protection, social justice and rights, ensuring environmental 
sustainability, building the ASEAN identity, and narrowing the development gap. Regarding the ASCC, nearly three-
quarters of the respondents perceived that the formation of ASCC would be good for the social and cultural development 
of their country (See Table 3). Respondents showed their beliefs that ASCC would bring about positive results in terms of 
the increase of the variety and richness of ASEAN Culture, the creation of a caring community, and the improvement of 
the health of the people in the region. 
 
5.2 Supports for the Formation of the ASEAN Community 
 
In this study, support was defined as the position hold by the public on the formation of the ASEAN Community and its 
three pillars. In general, the study found that the respondents highly supported the proposed ASEAN Community (see 
Table 4). A great majority of respondents in the three countries surveyed supported the establishment of the ASEAN 
Community. Specifically, more than three-quarters respondents in three countries supported the formation of APSC. 
Regarding the economic regional integration, about 73% to 85% respondents supported the AEC. Furthermore, between 
70% and 79% respondents supported the formation of ASCC.  
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Table 4: Supports for the formation of the ASEAN Community 
 
 Respondents Malaysia Indonesia Singapore Average 
I support the formation of the ASEAN Community. 
• Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree 
• Mean 4.05 4.14 4.00 4.08 
Agree Agree Agree Agree 
I support the formation of the APSC. 
• Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree 
• Mean 3.92 4.00 3.84 3.94 
Agree Agree Agree Agree 
I support the establishment of AEC. 
• Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree 
• Mean 4.00 3.96 3.81 3.94 
Agree Agree Agree Agree 
I support the formation of ASCC. 
• Mode Agree Agree Agree Agree 
• Mean 3.89 3.89 3.82 3.87 
Agree Agree Agree Agree 
 
Source: Result of field surveys conducted by the researchers 
 
5.3 Perception on the Formation Process of ASEAN Community 
 
While the survey results have showed that the idea of the ASEAN Community was supported by the majority of the 
respondents, it is interesting to observe the respondents’ views on the formation process of the ASEAN Community. 
Several scholarly works – like Amitav Acharya (2003), Claire Sutherland (2009), Guido Benny, Rashila Ramli and Than 
Siew Yean (2014), Jenina Joy Chavez (2007), Kamarulnizam Abdullah and Guido Benny (2013), Kamarulnizam 
Abdullah, Guido Benny, and Mohamed Anwar Omar Din (2013), Lily Zubaidah Rahim (2008), Melly Caballero-Anthony 
(2009), Ravichandran Moorthy and Guido Benny (2013), Rodolfo Severino (2007), Sung Won Kim (2010), and Thi Thu 
Huong Dang (2008) – had affirmed the ASEAN Community formation process as elitist and state-centric; it had yet to 
involve the people directly. Their argument is that only leaders, bureaucrats, and businesspeople have been deciding the 
course of the ASEAN Community creation (Benny and Abdullah, 2011). Amitav Acharya (2009), for example, asserted 
that it was the elite groups that had controlled most of the countries as the political system of illiberal non-democracy 
existed in most ASEAN countries. Both writers argued that the elite groups had been able to manipulate the social 
consciousness in the region for the purpose of creating a pacific union, similar to the one which had been socially 
constructed by liberal democracies. Thus, it is quite important to gauge the opinion to the process of fostering greater 
regional integration.  
 
Table 5: Perception on the formation process of ASEAN Community 
 
 Respondents Malaysia Indonesia Singapore Average 
The formation of the ASEAN Community is the 
initiative of the elite and does not involve the 
people. 
• Yes 45% 51% 40% 46% 
• No 55% 49% 60% 54% 
The formation of ASEAN Community is merely a 
declaration of ASEAN leaders not fruitful to the 
people. 
• Yes 35% 22% 29% 28% 
• No 65% 78% 71% 72% 
 
Source: Result of field surveys conducted by the researchers 
 
The result of survey, as indicated in Table 5, provides additional support for the above stated stand. For example, more 
than half of Indonesian respondents admitted that the formation of ASEAN Community was the initiative of the elite and 
did not involve the public in its creation. While the majority of Malaysian and Singaporean respondents did not fully 
concur with their Indonesian counterparts, there were still a significant number who hold the same opinion with the 
majority of the Indonesian respondents. However, this did not appear to undermine the perceived benefit of the initiatives, 
as almost three-quarters of them admitted that the ideas would be fruitful to the people. This perception was also 
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consistent with the finding about public perception of the benefits of ASEAN Community. Hence, it can be concluded that, 
while the formation process of ASEAN Community was perceived to be elitist, the respondents were still committed to its 
formation since it was perceived to benefit the people.  
 
5.4 Effect of Perception of the Elitist State-Centric Formation Process on Perceived Benefits and Support 
 
The study is aimed to discuss the effect of the opinion of the formation process that does not involve the people on 
perception of benefits and the support for the establishment of ASEAN Community. It was hypothesized that the opinion 
of the formation process would influence the perception of benefits and public supports for ASEAN Community. 
Analysis of the survey data using the chi-square tests on the relationship between the opinion of the formation 
process and the perceived benefits from ASEAN Community is exhibited at Table 6(A). With some exception in the 
relationship with formation of APSC, the analysis of chi-square tests has indicated that significant positive relationship 
between opinion of the formation process and perceived benefits. Had the respondents perceived the formation as 
involving the people, their perceived benefits would be higher. 
 
Table 6: The result of chi-square tests on the effects of the perception of the formation process on perceived benefits and 
supports for the ASEAN Community 
 
 
Pearson Chi Square
Result of analysis Value df Asymp.Sig (2-sided) 
A. Relationships between ‘the perception that the formation of the ASEAN Community does not involve the 
people’ and the indicators of perceived benefits: 
• My country will get benefits from the membership of 
the ASEAN Community. 16.218 4 0.003 
Significant 
relationship 
• The establishment is good for my country and the 
people. 13.870 4 0.008 
Significant 
relationship 
• The formation of APSC is good for my country and 
society. 6.018 4 0.198 
No significant 
relationship 
• My country will get benefits from membership in 
AEC. 18.424 4 0.001 
Significant 
relationship 
• ASCC is good for the social and cultural 
development of my country. 10.065 4 0.039 
Significant 
relationship 
B. Relationships between ‘the perception that the formation of the ASEAN Community does not involve the 
people’ and the indicators of supports: 
• Support for the establishment of ASEAN 
Community 9.461 4 0.051 
Significant 
relationship 
• Support for the establishment of ASEAN Political 
Security Community (APSC) 8.388 4 0.078 
Significant 
relationship 
• Support for the establishment of ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC) 12.841 4 0.012 
Significant 
relationship 
• Support for the establishment of ASEAN Socio-
Cultural Community (ASCC) 9.485 4 0.050 
Significant 
relationship 
 
Source: Result of field surveys conducted by the researchers 
 
The similar analysis on the data of the perceived benefits also showed that, in general, the perception of the formation 
process might have influenced the perception of benefits of ASEAN Community. Analysis of the survey data using the 
chi-square tests on the relationship between the opinion of the formation process and the support is exhibited at Table 
6(B). The scores of the chi-square tests indicated the significant relationships between the opinion and the supports for 
the formation of ASEAN Community and its three pillars. Thus, it is implied that if the formation had been perceived as 
involving the people, there would be more supports for the formation. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
The study argues that public perception of benefits, supports, and perception of the formation process of the ASEAN 
Community need to be studied in order to plan effective strategies for its formation. This study has found that the 
respondents’ perception of benefits, which was positive, was related to their perception of the formation process of the 
ASEAN Community. They also exhibited their support for the ASEAN Community although the formation process did not 
involve the public; however, the study found that, if the formation process had involved the people more actively, their 
perception of benefits and level of supports for the regional community would be higher.  
Two implications can be inferred from the study. The first implication is on the public support and perception of 
benefits for the ASEAN Community. Although it is arguable that the public has perceived the formation of ASEAN 
Community as beneficial and they support it, we must put into our mind that the public opinion may change over time. 
Thus, ASEAN Secretariat – together with national governments – needs to formulate effective strategies to maintain 
positive public perception and supports for ASEAN Community. To find out the actual aspiration and attitudes of the 
public, the ASEAN Secretariat need to establish an agency to conduct regular ‘ASEANbarometer’ public opinion surveys 
in the ASEAN countries, so that the decision making for ASEAN Community can be based on the expectations of the 
people. The survey is considered the best measure because, given the current plurality of political systems of ASEAN 
countries, it is impossible to conduct direct voting like as in the European Union. Without the regular surveys, the real 
perception, opinion, and supports of the public will never be known and it will be more difficult to make effective decisions 
that cater to the needs and wants of the public. 
The second implication is related to the perception that the formation process of the ASEAN Community did not 
involve the public. The perception is more serious in Indonesia than in Malaysia and Singapore since the perception is 
higher in this largest and most populated country in ASEAN. The finding indicates that the Indonesian government might 
have neglected its public in the formation process of the ASEAN Community. This is of concern because the democratic 
system that Indonesia has embraced requires more public involvement – something that might have yet to occur when 
the Indonesian government formulated the ASEAN Community together with their counterparts in the other ASEAN 
countries. So, the Indonesian government needs to pursue its efforts at socializing the ASEAN Community more 
aggressively and work together with civil societies to prepare the public to face regional integration. It is also suggested 
that the Indonesian government ought to involve the public more intensively when they make major decisions about the 
regional community. 
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